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Abstract
We study intertemporal decision making under uncertainty. We give the first full charac-
terization of discounted expected utility in a framework a` la Savage. Despite the popularity
of this model, no characterization is available in the literature. The concept of stationarity,
introduced by Koopmans for deterministic discounted utility, plays a central role for both
attitudes towards time and towards uncertainty. We show that a strong stationarity ax-
iom characterizes discounted expected utility. When hedging considerations are taken into
account, a weaker stationarity axiom generalizes discounted expected utility to Choquet
discounted expected utility, allowing for non-neutral attitudes towards uncertainty.
Keywords: Intertemporal choice, ambiguity, (Choquet) discounted expected utility, sta-
tionarity.
JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D83, D84.
1 Introduction
When making economic decisions, agents usually need to take into account two important
dimensions: time and uncertainty. Consider for instance a firm that wants to implement a
project that will deliver a stochastic cash flow in the future or a government that needs to
decide how to allocate its budget taking into account GDP growth in the following years.
In both cases, decision makers (DMs henceforth) are required to make choices that involve
uncertain outcomes occurring at future dates.
One of the most popular models used both in microeconomics and macroeconomics to evalu-
ate uncertain streams of income or consumption, is the (exponential) discounted expected utility
model. The choice problem faced by the firm or the government can be formalized in the follow-
ing way. Suppose that, at time t = 0, Nature chooses a state of the world ω ∈ Ω which is hidden
to the agent. The state of the world determines the amounts of income that the DM will receive
across future periods. Given ω ∈ Ω, she gets ht(ω) at time t ≥ 0, where ht is a measurable
function over Ω. Therefore, at time t = 0, she is facing a stochastic stream of income. The
discounted expected utility model says that the stochastic stream h := (h0, h1, . . . ) is evaluated
through the function
V (h) =
∞∑
t=0
βtEP [u(ht)], (1)
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where u(·) is an instantaneous utility function, the DM’s attitude towards time is described
through the discount factor βt with β ∈ (0, 1) and the expectation is taken with respect to a
subjective probability P over Ω. Mathematically, the expression in (1) prescribes to compute
the expected utility of the random variables ht, actualize its value through the discount factor
βt and sum up the actualized expected utilities.3
The intuitiveness and mathematical tractability of formula (1) has made discounted expected
utility the most popular way to model intertemporal decisions involving uncertainty. However,
and quite surprisingly, to our knowledge there is no axiomatization available in the literature of
the discounted expected utility model in a framework a` la Savage [29].4 Our first contribution
consists in providing a set of axioms that delivers the formula in (1). Axiomatizations enable
us to understand which behavioral conditions stand behind a utility function. See Gilboa,
Postlewaite, Samuelson and Schmeidler [14] for a recent explanation about the importance of
representation results. In this sense, our work is helpful from a meta-scientific point of view as
we relate abstract non-observable concepts such as utilities, subjective probabilities and discount
factors to preferences, which are, in principle, observable. For instance, when an environmental
economist suggests a specific policy to a government on the basis of the discounted expected
utility model, it would be desirable that he or she knows the properties of preferences he or
she is assuming. As it turns out, the key behavioral feature that delivers discounted expected
utility is a stationarity condition.
Stationarity is an axiom proposed by Koopmans [18], [19] in the deterministic framework
in order to characterize discounted utility. The formula of discounted utility appeared before
its axiomatization and it is due to Samuelson [28]. According to this model a DM evaluates a
deterministic stream of income d := (d0, d1, . . . ) through the following utility function
V (d) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(dt). (2)
Koopmans’ stationarity axiom asserts that if an agent is indifferent between two streams of
income, then she will remain indifferent if we shift all incomes one period ahead and insert a
common first period income. The reasoning can be done the other way round. If an agent
is indifferent between two streams that are equal in the first component, then she will remain
indifferent if we drop this first coordinate and advance all other incomes by one period for both
streams.
To illustrate, consider the following example. A PhD candidate is looking for an academic
job. She is indifferent between two offers from university x and university y. The universities
pay her the salaries (correlated to the monthly teaching load) listed in the table below.
sep oct nov dec . . .
x0, x1, . . . 10 20 1 . . . . . .
y0, y1, . . . 5 23 2 . . . . . .
3There are several interesting ways to discount the future. While exponential discounting may be appropriate
in the case of a firm, who can set β = 1
1+r
where r is the interest rate, it may not be so compelling for other
types of agents. For instance, interesting alternatives are the hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic and quasi-geometric
discounting, see Loewenstein and Prelec [22], Laibson [21], Montiel Olea and Strzalecki [24], Phelps and Pollak
[25] and Hayashi [15]. Another interesting approach appears in Chambers and Echenique [5] where the authors
study models with multiple discount factors. We would like to stress that the focus of this paper is about
axiomatization of exponential discounted expected utility and its possible generalizations under uncertainty.
This is why we confine our study to the standard case of exponential discounting.
4For an axiomatization of the discounted expected utility model with an infinite horizon under risk one can
see Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Epstein [9].
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Suppose that a new law postpones the beginning of the academic year to October, and that the
government obliges all universities to give a compensation of z = 7 to the newly hired professors
in September. The streams of income now look like
sep oct nov dec . . .
z, x0, x1, . . . 7 10 20 1 . . .
z, y0, y1, . . . 7 5 23 2 . . .
Stationarity asserts that if the PhD candidate is indifferent between the two universities before
the law, she should also stay indifferent afterwards.
When uncertainty is involved, we introduce a stationarity axiom that characterizes dis-
counted expected utility. A DM who is indifferent between two uncertain streams should remain
indifferent if, given a period t, the random incomes of both streams are shifted one period ahead
starting from t, and a stochastic amount of income ht is inserted in period t.
5 The similarity
between the behavioral content of our axiom and Koopmans’ original axiom should be obvious.
Theorem 1, one of our main results, characterizes discounted expected utility with the help of
this property.
As it turns out, the implications of the stationarity axiom in presence of uncertainty are way
stronger than in the deterministic framework. Consider the following simple example in which
Ω contains only two states of nature Ω = {ω1, ω2}. A DM is indifferent between two streams of
income f = (ft)t and g = (gt)t that pay 0$ in all periods except in some period k > 0, where
fk(ω1) = gk(ω2) = 10$ and fk(ω2) = gk(ω1) = −10$. We see that with stream f the agent
is “rich” if Nature chooses ω1 and “poor” if Nature chooses ω2. The opposite is true for g.
Consider now a random variable h defined by h(ω1) = 10$ and h(ω2) = −10$. Suppose that
the agent’s preferences satisfy stationarity. Then if we shift fk and gk in period k + 1 and we
put h in period k preferences should not change: the agent should remain indifferent between
these two new streams. However with the stream (. . . , h, fk, . . . ), if Nature chooses ω1 (resp.
ω2), the DM will be “rich” (resp. “poor”) for two consecutive periods, whereas with the stream
(. . . , h, gk, . . . ) the DM is sure to be “rich” in at least one period, whatever the choice of Nature.
A pessimistic agent, who thinks that nature is playing against him, may have a strict preference
for the safer stream (. . . , h, gk, . . . ). In this case we say that the DM can temporally hedge
against uncertainty. Imposing stationarity when hedging considerations can be done may be
quite demanding, and this is why, under uncertainty, we named the axiom Strong Stationarity.
The example above shows a particular case of a more general concept. Loosely speaking,
two random variables φ,ψ are comonotonic if they “vary in the same direction”: when φ takes
relative high (low) values, ψ also takes relative high (low) values. For instance, in the example,
h is comonotonic with fk but not with gk. Comonotonic random variables do not make it
possible to hedge against uncertainty since they are positively correlated. A generalization of
Strong Stationarity, that we call Comonotonic Stationarity, restricts the shifts prescribed by
Strong Stationarity only to cases in which no hedging considerations can be done. Technically,
we require the stochastic income plugged at period t to be comonotonic with all variables that
follow in both sequences. Theorem 2, which is our second important contribution, shows that
substituting Strong Stationarity with Comonotonic Stationarity makes it possible to generalize
discounted expected utility to the following representation
V (h) =
∫ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dv. (3)
5The main difference with the deterministic framework is that we require the property of stationarity for every
period t. This is needed for some technical issues about measurability that will be explained once the formal
setting is introduced.
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The integral is a Choquet integral, taken with respect to a capacity v. While a precise math-
ematical definition will be given later, we just recall here that a capacity is a non-necessarily
additive set function and the Choquet integral is a mathematical tool needed in order to take
expectations with respect to it.
The Choquet expected utility model was introduced in economics in an atemporal setting
in the seminal paper of Schmeidler [31]. This model generalizes the expected utility model and
solves the famous Ellsberg’s paradox, see Ellsberg [8]. Loosely speaking, the paradox shows
that agents cannot quantify uncertainty in terms of a (single) probability measure. In this
sense, our model of Choquet discounted expected utility in (3) parallels Schmeidler’s work in
the atemporal setting. It is interesting to notice that the Choquet model has been fruitfully
applied to an intertemporal setting at least since Gilboa [12]. Gilboa’s paper however differs
from ours since uncertainty is absent and the Choquet integral is used to model aversion (or
love) for variability of payments across time.
There is a rich literature concerning decision making under uncertainty, and several models
have been proposed to address the Ellsberg paradox. A popular way to take into account
agents’ behavior towards uncertainty is through the MaxMin expected utility model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [13].6 This model, developed in the atemporal setting, says that a DM does
not rank acts through expected utility, but rather she has a set of probabilities in her mind
and she takes the minimum expected utility calculated with respect to the probabilities in
this set. In a recent paper, Kochov [16] provided a generalization of discounted expected
utility (1) by considering an intertemporal version of the MaxMin expected utility model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [13]. Instead of a single probability measure, the DM considers a set of
possible probabilities and evaluates stochastic streams by the minimum (taken with respect to
the probabilities in that set) of the discounted expected utilities. We will discuss this relevant
article in the main body of our paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework and
notation. Section 3 recalls Koopmans’ discounted utility model and presents his axioms and
result. This paves the way to Section 4 in which we introduce uncertainty and we axiomatize the
discounted expected utility model. Section 5 generalizes the previous section by characterizing
the Choquet discounted utility model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are gathered in the
Appendix.
2 Framework and Mathematical Preliminaries
We borrow Kochov’s [16] setting and notation. Time is discrete and identified with N =
{0, 1, 2, . . . }. Let X be a connected, separable and first-countable topological space. It will
be interpreted as the space of outcomes. For instance, if X is a convex subset of Rn, then x ∈ X
may represent a bundle of goods. Let Ω be the set of states of nature. A filtration (Ft)t over Ω
is a sequence of algebras such that F0 = {∅,Ω} and Ft ⊆ Ft+1 for all t ∈ N. We denote by F
the union of these algebras F := ∪tFt. A stochastic process h := (ht)t∈N is a sequence such that
ht is a Ft-measurable function from Ω to X for all t. We sometimes call measurable functions
random variables. The following technical assumption, taken from Kochov [16], restricts the set
of stochastic processes that we consider.
Assumption. Stochastic processes are bounded and finite. Boundedness means that for each act
6There are several other models that deal with choice under uncertainty and may exhibit non neutral attitudes
towards uncertainty. For instance the already cited Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler [31], the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [17], the variational model of Maccheroni, Marinacci and
Rustichini [23], the confidence model of Chateauneuf and Faro [7] etc.
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h there exists a compact set Kh ⊂ X such that ∪tht(Ω) ⊂ Kh. Finiteness means that for each
act h there is a finitely generated algebra Ah ⊂ F such that ht is Ah-measurable for all t ∈ N.
We denote by H the set of bounded and finite stochastic processes
H := {h = (ht)t∈N|ht : Ω → X,ht is Ft-measurable ∀t and h is finite and bounded}.
A sequence h ∈ H will be called act. The set D ⊂ H denotes the set of deterministic acts: we
have d ∈ D if and only if dt is a constant random variable for all t ∈ N and there exists a compact
set Kd ⊆ X such that dt ∈ Kd for all t ≥ 0. As usual we identify D with a subset of X
∞. For
example, if X = R then D = l∞, the set of real-valued bounded sequences. When x ∈ X and
d ∈ D, (x, d) denotes the act (x, d0, d1, . . . ). Obviously the procedure can be repeated as in
(x, y, d) = (x, y, d0, d1, . . . ) and so on.
A (normalized) capacity v on the measurable space (Ω,F) is a set function v : F 7→ R such
that v(∅) = 0, v(Ω) = 1 and for all A,B ∈ F , A ⊂ B ⇒ v(A) ≤ v(B). Given a capacity v on
(Ω,F), the Choquet integral of a real-valued, bounded, F-measurable function f : Ω→ R with
respect to v is defined as∫
Ω
f dv :=
∫ 0
−∞
(v({f ≥ t})− 1) dt+
∫ +∞
0
v({f ≥ t}) dt,
where {f ≥ t} = {ω ∈ Ω|f(ω) ≥ t}. A capacity v : F 7→ R is convex if, for all A,B ∈ F ,
v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B). A (finitely additive) probability P : F 7→ R is a capacity
such that A ∩B = ∅ implies P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B). The core of a capacity v is defined by
core(v) = {P |P is a probability s.t. P (A) ≥ v(A)∀A ∈ F}. Finally, if P is a probability, then
we denote the integral with respect to P of a real-valued, bounded, F-measurable function f
with the usual notation for expectation
∫
Ω f dP = EP [f ].
3 The deterministic setting: Discounted Utility
We begin characterizing (deterministic) discounted utility through a set of axioms in the spirit
of Koopmans [18], [19]. Koopmans’ axioms are well known in the literature. Yet, as Bleichrodt,
Rohde and Wakker [2] put it “his analysis is obscured by technical digressions and several
inaccuracies. It is, for instance, never stated what the domain of preference is, i.e. which
consumption programs are considered, and there is an unanticipated implication of bounded
utility”. Bleichrodt et al. [2] correct Koopmans’ paper and greatly extend the domain of
application of his model. In this section we slightly modify Bleichrodt et al. [2] in order to
provide an axiomatization that is closer to the one of Koopmans and that naturally generalizes
to our framework with uncertainty. The reader who is familiar with Koopmans [18], [19] and
Bleichrodt et al. [2] can skip this section and proceed directly to the more general Section 4.
Let % be a complete and transitive binary relation over the set of deterministic acts D. We
denote ∼ and ≻ its symmetric and asymmetric part. This relation represents the preferences
of a DM deciding at time t = 0 among deterministic X-valued streams. Given the preference
relation % over D and x, y ∈ X, we write x % y if (x, x, ...) % (y, y, ...). Thus, preferences over
X agree with preferences over constant deterministic acts.
Koopmans calls his axioms postulates and we keep the same terminology here. The postu-
lates in this section parallel the one in Koopmans [19]. As Koopmans himself notices, see p. 81
in [19], the postulates are not logically independent, see also Footnote 7.
The first postulate is technical, it says that the preference relation % is continuous with
respect to the product topology. This postulate differs from the continuity requirement in
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Koopmans [19]. He assumed X to be metrizable (a stronger assumption than the one made
here) and the preference relation % to be continuous with respect to the sup-norm topology
over D.7
P.1 (Continuity) For all compact sets K ⊂ X and for all deterministic acts d′ ∈ D, the sets
{d ∈ K∞|d % d′} and {d ∈ K∞|d′ % d} are closed in the product topology over K∞.
Postulate P.2 says that period 0 is sensitive. This implies that % has a non empty strict part
and avoid the cases in which preferences are determined only by the tail behavior of sequences.
Formally,
P.2 (Sensitivity) There exist x, y ∈ X, d ∈ D such that (x, d) ≻ (y, d).
The third postulate, Time Separability, imposes that preferences between today and tomor-
row are not affected by consumption starting from period three. If two deterministic streams
are equal starting from the third period onward, then their ranking does not depend on the
continuations.
P.3 (Time Separability) For all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X and d, d′ ∈ D, (x, y, d) % (x′, y′, d) if and only if
(x, y, d′) % (x′, y′, d′).
The next postulate, called K-Stationarity (for Koopmans’ stationarity), plays a key role in
our analysis. Let us state it formally.
P.4 (K-Stationarity) For all x ∈ X and d, d′ ∈ D, d % d′ if and only if (x, d) % (x, d′).
P.4 asserts the following. Suppose that a DM prefers a deterministic stream d to d′. Postpone
all elements of the two sequences one period ahead (d0 and d
′
0 will be consumed in period
1, d1 and d
′
1 will be consumed in period 2 and so on) and introduce a common period-zero
consumption bundle x. Then she will prefer (x, d) to (x, d′). The same reasoning can be done
the other way around. If two streams have a common period zero consumption bundle, then it
can be dropped, all the bundles can be shifted one period back, and preferences will not change.
Finally, K-Monotonicity (for Koopmans’ monotonicity) says, roughly, that more is preferred
to less. Consider two deterministic streams d, d′ ∈ D and suppose that, for every period t, the
DM prefers the bundle dt rather than d
′
t. Then K-Monotonicity implies that d is preferred to
d′. If moreover preferences are strict in at least one period of time t, then d ≻ d′.
P.5 (K-Monotonicity) Let d, d′ ∈ D. If dt % d
′
t for all t, then d % d
′; if moreover dt ≻ d
′
t for
some t then d ≻ d′.
We state now the characterization of discounted utility.
Proposition 1. A preference relation % over D satisfies P.1-5 if and only if there exists a
continuous function u : X → R and a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that % is represented by
V (d) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(dt).
Moreover β is unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
In order to prove Proposition 1, we will show that postulates P.1-5 imply the axioms of
Bleichrodt et al. [2]. This will allow us to use their main result in order to get discounted
utility. The formal proof can be found in the Appendix.
7Continuity with respect to the product topology is a stronger requirement than continuity with respect to the
sup-norm topology. However, as notice in Kochov [16], this allows us to drop the metrizability assumption and
it makes P.2 and P.5 redundant. This is proved formally in Proposition 2. Axiom P.2 and P.5 will be explicitly
dropped in Section 4.
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4 Uncertainty and Discounted Expected Utility
We introduce now uncertainty in the model of Section 3. Let % be a non-trivial (i.e. with a
non-empty strict part ≻), complete and transitive binary relation over H. Recall that an act
h ∈ H is a bounded and finite stochastic process: at time t = 0 Nature chooses a state ω ∈ Ω
(hidden to the DM at time t = 0 and at any finite time t) and the DM receives ht(ω) in period
t. The relation % represents the preferences of the DM over acts.8
The following three axioms are taken directly form Kochov [16]. We refer to them as basic
axioms.
Continuity (C) For all compact sets K ⊂ X and for all acts h ∈ H the sets {d ∈ K∞|d % h}
and {d ∈ K∞|h % d} are closed in the product topology over K∞.
When X is a subset of Rn, continuity with respect to the product topology is a stronger
requirement than continuity with respect to the sup-norm topology. However, axiom (C) (to-
gether with the other axioms and non-triviality of the preference relation) makes it possible to
drop P.2 and P.5, see Footnote 7. Notice that (C) implies P.1.
The next axiom, Time Separability, is exactly the same as P.3 in Section 3. Several au-
thors drop this axiom in order to get endogenous discounting, see for instance Epstein [9] and
Bommier, Kochov and Le Grand [4]. We keep Time Separability in order to obtain a constant
exponential discount factor.
Time Separability (TS) For all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X and d, d′ ∈ D, (x, y, d) % (x′, y′, d) if and only
if (x, y, d′) % (x′, y′, d′).
Before introducing Monotonicity we need a piece of notation. Let h ∈ H and ω ∈ Ω, then
h(ω) denotes the (deterministic) sequence (h0(ω), h1(ω), . . . ) ∈ D.
Monotonicity (M) For all h, g ∈ H, if h(ω) % g(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω then h % g.
Under uncertainty, axiom (M) has a different interpretation than P.5. Suppose that the
DM prefers the deterministic act h(ω) rather that the deterministic act g(ω) for every possible
choice ω of Nature. Than (M) says that she should prefer h to g.
The axiom Strong Stationarity represents the first novelty of the paper. It generalizes K-
Stationarity and, together with the other basic axioms, it allows us to characterize discounted
expected utility.
Strong Stationarity (SS) For all t ∈ N, f, g, h ∈ H,
(h0, . . . , ht−1, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (h0, . . . , ht−1, gt, gt+1, . . . )⇔
(h0, . . . , ht−1, ht, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (h0, . . . , ht−1, ht, gt, gt+1, . . . )
Axiom (SS) has the same behavioral interpretation of K-Stationarity. Consider two acts
that are equal until period t and suppose that the first act is preferred to the second one. Then
we can shift all variables one period ahead starting from period t, introduce a common random
variable ht in period t and the DM’s preferences will not change. As for K-Stationarity, the
reasoning can be done the other way around, i.e. the variable ht can be dropped, all the other
variables can be shifted one period back, and preferences will not change. It is not difficult to
see that (SS) implies K-Stationarity (just consider (SS) over D). A caveat is in order, since acts
8Notice that the DM is choosing only at time t = 0. Repeated choices are outside the scope of this paper as
we want to stick to Koopmans [19] original framework. There is an extensive literature about repeated choices,
recursive expected utility and dynamic consistency. A limited list of fundamental works in this area includes
(in chronological order) Strotz [33], Koopmans [18], Kreps and Porteus [20], Epstein and Zin [11], Skiadas [32],
Epstein and Schneider [10] and Bommier, Kochov and Le Grand [3].
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are adapted to the filtration (Ft)t, one needs to be careful not to shift back a Ft-measurable
variable to period t− 1, as this variable may not be Ft−1-measurable. Measurability is also the
reason why we need to state (SS) for all periods t and not only for period 0. If one states the
axiom only for shifts starting at period 0, it would be possible to insert only random variables
that are measurable with respect to F0, i.e. constant random variables. We will elaborate
more on this in Section 5.1 when we present a very weak stationairty axiom due to Kochov
[16]. It is important to notice that (SS) plays the role that the independence axiom has in
the Anscombe-Aumann model. Shifting variables one period ahead (or one period back) and
inserting (or removing) a variable ht can be done independently of the choice of the sequences
and the variable ht. We will come back on this in Section 5, after introducing the axiom of
Comonotonic Stationarity.
The following proposition formally shows that the set of axiom presented in this section
implies the axioms of Section 3.
Proposition 2. (C), (TS), (M) and (SS) imply P.1-5.
We are ready to state the main result of this section. The basic axioms (C), (M) and (TS)
together with (SS) deliver the discounted expected utility representation in (1).
Theorem 1. A preference relation % over H satisfies (C), (M), (TS) and (SS) if and only if
there exists a probability P : F → [0, 1], a continuous utility function u : X → R and a discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that % is represented by
V (h) = EP
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)
]
Moreover P and β are unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Theorem 1 follows as a corollary of the more general Theorem 2, which is stated in Section 5.
A last remark is in order. In the literature, the functional of Theorem 1 is usually written
∞∑
t=0
βtEP [u(ht)]
where the sum and the expected value operator are exchanged. Clearly this cannot be done
for the functionals in (3) and (5). However we show in Proposition 3 that for the discounted
expected utility model of Theorem 1 both forms are possible.
Proposition 3. For all h ∈ H, EP
[∑
t
βtu(ht)
]
=
∑
t
βtEP [u(ht)].
5 Comonotonic Stationarity and Choquet Discounted Expected
Utility
While discounted expected utility, axiomatized in Theorem 1, is widely used in economic ap-
plications, we argue that its behavioral foundations may not be that compelling. Example 1
below, already mentioned in the Introduction, shows that (SS) may be too requiring (this is
why we call this axiom Strong Stationarity) as it neglects possible hedging considerations made
by the DM.
Example 1. In this example we focus on the special case in which X is an interval of R, and
therefore an act can be interpreted as a stochastic flow of income. Let A ∈ Ft and consider
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two acts f ∼ g, with f = (d0, . . . , dt−1, ft, dt+1, . . . ) and g = (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, d
′
t+1, . . . ) that are
constant in every period except in period t in which they are defined by
ft(ω) =
{
10$ if ω ∈ A
−10$ if ω ∈ Ac
and gt(ω) =
{
−10$ if ω ∈ A
10$ if ω ∈ Ac.
Consider now an act h ∈ H such that ht(ω) =
{
10$ if ω ∈ A
−10$ if ω ∈ Ac
.
If we try to apply (SS) and we shift all variables one period ahead introducing ht in period
t we may observe
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ft, dt+1, . . . ) ≺ (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, gt, d
′
t+1, . . . ).
This happens because in case of bad luck, formally for ω ∈ Ac, the act on the left of the preference
relation makes the DM “poor” for 2 consecutive dates (she gets -10$ in t and -10$ in t + 1).
Whereas by choosing the act on the right she can be sure that she will be“rich” in at least one
period. Introducing ht in front of gt gives a temporal hedge to the DM against any choice of
nature. Of course (SS) would forbid a strict preference between the two new acts as we have
f ∼ g.
Recall that two random variables f, g from Ω to X are comonotonic if there is no ω and
ω′ in Ω such that f(ω) ≻ f(ω′) and g(ω′) ≻ g(ω).9 Notice that a constant random variable
is comonotonic with any other random variable. If X is a convex interval of R, two random
variables f, g are comonotonic if for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, [f(ω)− f(ω′)] · [g(ω)− g(ω′)] ≥ 0 (here we
implicitly assume that more money is preferred to less money). It is not difficult to check that
in Example 1 the variables ht and ft are comonotonic, whereas ht and gt are not. Therefore,
putting ht and gt one after the other can lead to some hedging considerations.
A DM can temporally hedge against nature’s choices whenever two consecutive random vari-
ables are not comonotonic. On the other hand, two consecutive comonotonic random variables
remove any hedging consideration that could be done by the agent.
The second and important novelty of our paper is represented by the axiom Comonotonic
Stationarity. This axiom weaken (SS) by taking into account temporal hedging. The idea is
simply to restrict the set of acts on which (SS) has a bite. The formal statement follows.
Comonotonic Stationarity (CS) For all t ∈ N, d ∈ D and f, g, h ∈ H such that ht is
comonotonic with fi and gi for all i ≥ t,
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, gt+1, . . . )⇔
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, gt, gt+1, . . . )
Axiom (CS) allows the same type of shifts as (SS) only when the random variable ht,
inserted in period t, is comonotonic with all random variables after period t for both acts f
and g. Comonotonic random variables do not allow for hedging between different periods of
time. Therefore (CS) generalizes (SS) (in the sense that (SS) implies (CS)) limiting its range of
action. Shifts can be performed only when no hedging considerations can be done. For instance
the preferences described in Example 1 are admissible under (CS).
It is interesting to stress the conceptual similarity of axiom (CS) with the axiom Comono-
tonic Independence of Schmeidler [31]. Comonotonic Independence restricts the classical In-
dependence axiom of expected utility to comonotonic acts. In the Anscombe and Aumann [1]
9Preferences over X are defined in Section 3.
9
(atemporal) framework, acts are functions from states of the world to lotteries over X. The
Independence axiom says that for any three acts f, g and h and any mixing weight α ∈ [0, 1],
f % g if and only if αf + (1 − α)h % αg + (1 − α)h. Comonotonic Independence retains this
property only when the act h is comonotonic with both f and g, see Schmeidler [31]. In this
latter case, no hedging can occur when h is mixed with f or g. In our framework, hedging is
not achieved by probability mixing but through “time mixing”. Hence (SS) plays the role of
Independence while (CS) the one of Comonotonic Independence.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. A preference relation % over H satisfies (C), (M), (TS) and (CS) if and only if
there exists a capacity v : F → [0, 1], a continuous utility function u : X → R and a discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that % is represented by
V (h) =
∫ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dv.
Moreover v and β are unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
5.1 Uncertainty Aversion
In this section we consider the case of uncertainty aversion. As it will be clearer later, uncertainty
aversion is akin to some form of pessimism. This justifies the name of the following axiom.
Pessimistic Stationarity (PS) The preference relation % satisfies (CS). Moreover for all
t ∈ N, for all d ∈ D and for all f, g, h ∈ H such that ht is comonotonic with gi for all i ≥ t,
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, gt+1, . . . )⇒
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, gt, gt+1, . . . )
It has the same interpretation of Wakker’s [34] axiom Pessimism Independence. See also
Chateauneuf [6]. For a pessimistic DM shifting all variables one period ahead starting from
period t and inserting a comonotonic variable in front of gt will decrease the appreciation of
the act (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, gt+1, . . . ). On the other end, the possibly non-comonotonic variable in
front of ft, will make the other stream more appealing.
Consider again Exemple 1. If DM’s preferences satisfy (PS) one will actually observe the
path of choices described in the example, namely
f ∼ g ⇒ (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ft, dt+1, . . . ) ≺ (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, gt, d
′
t+1, . . . ).
The intuition is that a pessimistic DM thinks that if she chooses the act on the left of the strict
preference, then w ∈ Ac will happen and she will be “poor” for two periods. The other act
instead allows a temporal hedge and it is therefore preferred by someone who dislikes uncertainty.
Notice that (PS) implies (CS) and hence Theorem 2 remains valid if (CS) is replaced by
(PS). Since this latter axiom is stronger, we can prove in Theorem 3 that the capacity appearing
in the Choquet integral is convex.
Theorem 3. A preference relation % over H satisfies (C), (M), (TS) and (PS) if and only if
there exists a convex capacity v : F → [0, 1], a continuous utility function u : X → R and a
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that % is represented by
V (h) =
∫ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dv.
Moreover v and β are unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
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It is known that (see Schmeidler [30]) when v is a convex capacity the following equality
holds ∫ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dv = min
P∈core(v)
EP
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)
]
. (4)
This equality suggests a sharp interpretation of a Choquet integral with respect a convex ca-
pacity v and justifies why we call pessimist a DM with preferences as the ones in Theorem 3.
When v is convex, an agent reasons as if she computes the discounted expected utility for all
probabilities in core(v) and then selects the minimal one. This representation is similar to the
one axiomatized by Kochov [16].
Consider the following axiom proposed by Kochov [16].
Intertemporal Hedging (IH) For all t ∈ N, for all d ∈ D and for all g, h ∈ H,
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ht, dt+2 . . . ) ∼ (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, gt, dt+2 . . . )
⇒ (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, ht, dt+2 . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ht, dt+2 . . . )
The interpretation of (IH) is that a DM prefers to smooth consumption through states rather
than through time. This in turns implies that she is pessimistic vis-a`-vis Nature’s choice of the
state of the world. We can notice in fact that the act (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, ht, dt+2 . . . ) allows for a
temporal mix that may provide some hedging against uncertainty. As explained by Kochov [16]
this axiom is the intertemporal counterpart to the Ambiguity Aversion axiom of Gilboa and
Schmeidler [13].
We show now that the representation of Theorem 3 can be obtained also using (IH) and
weakening (PS) to (CS).
Theorem 4. A preference relation % over H satisfies (C), (M), (TS), (CS) and (IH) if and
only if there exists a convex capacity v : F → [0, 1], a continuous utility function u : X → R
and a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that % is represented by
V (h) =
∫ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dv.
Moreover v and β are unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The utility function in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 is a particular case of the intertemporal
MaxMin model studied by Kochov [16]
V (h) = min
P∈P
EP
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)
]
(5)
where P is a convex and closed (with respect to the weak* topology) set of probabilities.
Actually, if one sets P = core(v), the utilities in (4) and (5) are exactly the same.
If one is willing to obtain Kochov’s [16] Theorem 1, in which he characterizes the utility
function in (5), then (CS) should be weakened to the following axiom (called Stationarity (S)
in Kochov [16]).
Kochov Stationarity (KochS) For all x ∈ X and h, g ∈ H, h % g if and only if (x, h) % (x, g).
This axiom is weaker than (CS) since the outcome x ∈ X can be identified with a constant
random variable, which is comonotonic with all other variables. Notice also that it is not needed
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to state the axiom for all periods of time t ∈ N. A constant random variable is Ft-measurable
for all t ∈ N and therefore there are no measurability concerns. The interpretation of this
axiom is the same as for K-Stationarity. Kochov [16] underlines an interesting parallel between
(KochS) and the Certainty Independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler [13].
Proposition 4 recalls how the different stationarity axioms presented in the paper are linked
one to another.
Proposition 4. The following implications hold:
(SS)⇒ (PS)⇒ (CS)⇒ (KochS)⇒ (K-Stationaity).
Weakening (CS) to (KochS) and adding (IH) to the other basic axioms, allow us to recover
Kochov’s [16] main result (Theorem 1, p. 245).
Theorem 5 (Kochov [16]). A preference relation % over H satisfies (C), (M), (TS), (KochS)
and (IH) if and only if there exists nonempty weak*-closed convex set P of probabilities, a
continuous strictly increasing utility function u : X → R and a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) such
that % is represented by
V (h) = min
P∈P
EP
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ht)
]
.
Moreover v and β are unique and u is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we make two contributions that can be of high interest for economists working
with problems that involve decisions through time and under uncertainty.
First, we axiomatize the discounted expected utility model in a framework without lotteries.
Despite the popularity of this model, no axiomatization is available in the literature. This paper
shows that a Strong Stationarity axiom is the key behavioral conditions behind discounted
expected utility. Strong Stationarity plays the same role as the Independece axiom for decisions
under uncertainty in an atemporal setting.
Second, we argue that Strong Stationarity neglects agents’ hedging behavior. Strong Sta-
tionarity is subject to the same critiques as the Independece axiom. We solve this problem
introducing a new axiom, Comonotonic Stationarity. This latter condition allows us to general-
ize the discounted expected utility model to the Choquet discounted expected utility model. Our
axioms have a simple interpretation, akin to the original stationarity condition of Koopmans
[18], [19]. Testing these axioms in the lab is an interesting topic for future work.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. As mentioned in Section 3, Bleichrodt et al. [2] do not use the same set of axioms that we employ.
Specifically they do not use axiom P.1 and axiom P.5. We list here their alternative axioms.
Notation: given T ∈ N, XT = {(x0, x1, . . . , xT , α, α)|x0, . . . , xT , α ∈ X}. Notice that, for any T ∈ N,
there is a one-to-one function from XT and the product X
T+1.
Ultimate Continuity (UC). % is continuous (with respect to the product topology) on each set XT , i.e.
the sets {x ∈ XT |x % y} and {x ∈ XT |y % x} are closed for all y ∈ XT .
Constant equivalent (CE). % satisfies constant equivalence if for all d ∈ D there exists a constant sequence
xd ∈ D such that d ∼ xd.
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Tail Robustness (TR). % satisfies tail robustness if for all constant sequence x ∈ D, if d ≻ (≺)x then
there exists t ∈ N such that (d0, . . . , dT , x, x, ) ≻ (≺)x for all T ≥ t.
Theorem 6 (Bleichrodt et al. [2]). Let % be defined over D′ ⊃ D, a domain that contains all ultimately
constant programs, then TFAE:
(i) DU holds over D′ with u continuous and not constant.
(ii) % satisfies P.2, P.3, P.5, UC, CE, TR.
In Observation 3, Bleichrodt et al. [2] noticed that “Tail robustness can also be replaced by mono-
tonicity if [D′] contains only bounded programs.” Boundededness means that for every d ∈ D′ there exist
x, y ∈ X such that x % d % y.
Remark. The definition of D (compactness) and P.5 imply boundedness. Therefore Observation 3 of
Bleichrodt et al. [2] applies and we only need to show that UC and CE hold.
Proposition 5. If a preference relation % over D satisfies P.1-5 then it satisfies UC and CE.
Proof. We show that % satisfies UC. Fix T ∈ N and y ∈ XT . We will show that the set Uy = {x ∈
XT |x % y} is closed.
Let (xˆn)n be a sequence in Uy such that xˆ
n → xˆ. Notice that xˆn = (xˆn0 , xˆ
n
1 , . . . , xˆ
n
T , αˆ
n, αˆn, . . . ). By
definition xˆn → xˆ if and only if xˆni → xˆi for all i ∈ N, with xˆ
n
i = αˆ
n for all i ≥ T + 1. Since xˆn ∈ XT ,
αˆn → αˆ and this implies that xˆ ∈ XT . The sets Ci = {xˆni |n ∈ N}, i = 0, . . . , T , and Cα = {αˆ
n|n ∈ N}
are compact and hence C =
(
∪Ti=0Ci
)
∪Cα is compact. Since xˆ ∈ D, there is a compact set Kˆ such that
xˆt ∈ Kˆ for all t ∈ N. Therefore K = C ∪ Kˆ is compact and xˆn, xˆ ∈ K∞ for all n ∈ N. Consider now
U = {d ∈ K∞|d % y}. We have therefore that for all n ∈ N, xˆn % y and xˆn ∈ U , moreover xˆn → xˆ and
since U is closed by P.1 we obtain xˆ % y. Hence Uy is closed.
We show that % satisfies CE. Fix d ∈ D, and let Kd be a compact set such that dt ∈ Kd for all t ∈ N.
By compactness, there are x0, x1 ∈ Kd such that x0 % dt % x1 for all t ∈ N. By P.5 we have x0 % d % x1.
Consider A = {y ∈ co(Kd)|y¯ % d} and B = {y ∈ co(Kd)|d % y¯}, where y¯ denotes the constant sequence
y¯ = (y, y, . . . ) and co(Kd) is the convex hull of Kd. By P.1, A, and B are closed and since x0 ∈ A and
x1 ∈ B they are both non empty. By connectedness of X we have that co(Kd) is connected and therefore
there exists xd ∈ co(Kd) such that xd ∼ d.
Proposition 5 and Theorem 6 of Bleichrodt et al. [2] imply Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It easy to see that (C)⇒ P.1, (TS)⇔ P.3, (SS)⇒ P.4.
Lemma A.1. (C), (M) and (SS) imply P.2.
Proof. See Lemma 5 in Kochov [16].
Lemma A.2. (C) and (SS) imply P.5.10
Proof. Recall that if x, y ∈ X , we define x % y ⇔ (x, x, . . . ) % (y, y, . . . ). We introduce the notation
(nx, d) = (x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
, d).
Claim 1. Let x, y ∈ X and d ∈ D. Then x % y ⇔ (x, d) % (y, d).
(⇒) By (SS), (x, x, . . . ) % (y, y, . . . ) ⇔ (x, d0, x, . . . ) % (y, d0, y, . . . ). By induction, we find that
for all t ∈ N, (x, x, . . . ) % (y, y, . . . ) ⇔ (x, d0, . . . , dt, x, x . . . ) % (y, d0, . . . , dt, y, y . . . ). The sequence
(x, d0, . . . , dt, x, x . . . ) converges to (x, d) as t→∞ therefore (C) implies (x, d) % (y, d).
(⇐) By (SS), (x, d) % (y, d) ⇔ (x, x, d) % (y, x, d). If (y, y, d) ≻ (y, x, d), then by (SS) we would have
(y, d) ≻ (x, d), a contradiction. Therefore (x, x, d) % (y, x, d) % (y, y, d). By induction we find that for
all n ∈ N, (nx, d) % (ny, d) and by (C), (x, x, . . . ) % (y, y, . . . ).
This conclude the prof of Claim 1.
10A similar statement is claimed without proof in (the proof of) Lemma 7 in Kochov [16].
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Claim 2. Let x, y ∈ X and d ∈ D. Then x ≻ y ⇔ (x, d) ≻ (y, d).
(⇒) By Claim 1, we know that (x, d) % (y, d). Suppose that (x, d) ∼ (y, d). Then by (SS), (x, x, d) ∼
(y, x, d) and (y, x, d) ∼ (y, y, d), hence (x, x, d) ∼ (y, y, d). By induction we find that for all n ∈ N,
(nx, d) ∼ (ny, d) and by (C), (x, x, . . . ) ∼ (y, y, . . . ). This contradict x ≻ y. Therefore we must have
(x, d) ≻ (y, d).
(⇐) Suppose (x, d) ≻ (y, d) but y % x. Then by Claim 1, (y, d) % (x, d), which is absurd. Hence x ≻ y.
Let d, d′ ∈ D such that dt % d′t for all t ∈ N. Fix n ∈ N, since dn % d
′
n, (SS) then implies
(dn−1, dn, dn, . . . ) % (dn−1, d
′
n, d
′
n, . . . ) and Claim 1 yields (dn−1, dn, dn, . . . ) % (d
′
n−1, d
′
n, d
′
n, . . . ). Ap-
plying n times this reasoning we obtain
(d0, d1, . . . , dn, dn, . . . ) % (d
′
0, d
′
1, . . . , d
′
n, d
′
n, . . . )
Since n was arbitrary, this is true for all n ∈ N. Letting n going to infinity, we notice that the sequence
on the left hand-side of the preference converges to d, and the one to the right hand-side converges to d′
in the product topology. Then (C) implies d % d′.
Suppose now that in addition dt ≻ d
′
t for some t. By Claim 2 we have (dt, dt+1, . . . ) ≻ (d
′
t, dt+1, . . . ).
Applying t times (SS) we obtain
(d0, . . . , dt−1, dt, dt+1, . . . ) ≻ (d0, . . . , dt−1, d
′
t, dt+1, . . . ).
By Claim 1, for all n ≥ t (d0, . . . , dt−1, d′t, dt+1, . . . ) % (d
′
0, . . . , d
′
n, dn+1 . . . ). Since the latter sequence
converge to d′, by (C) we have (d0, . . . , dt−1, d
′
t, dt+1, . . . ) % d
′ and hence d ≻ d′.
Therefore we proved that (C), (TS), (M) and (SS) imply P .1-5.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We first prove necessity of the axioms. Monotonicity (M) and Time Separability (TS) follow
from the properties of monotonicity and comonotonic additivity of the Choquet integral. Continuity
(C) is proved in Kochov [16] (p. 252). Given a compact set K ⊆ X , Kochov shows that the fact
that V (d) =
∑
t β
tu(dt) is continuous in the product topology on K
∞ implies (C) for the function
h → minP∈P EP [
∑
βtu(ht)]. The same argument shows that (C) holds also for h →
∫ ∑
βtu(ht)dv.
It is left to show Comonotonic Stationarity (CS). Fix t ∈ N, d ∈ D and f, g, h ∈ H such that ht is
comonotonic with fi and gi for all i ≥ t. Notice that ht is comonotonic with fi if and only if for all
ω, ω′ ∈ Ω
[u(ht(ω))− u(ht(ω
′))] [u(fi(ω))− u(fi(ω
′))] ≥ 0,
and the same is true for gi. Let ω and ω
′ be in Ω, we have
[u(ht(ω))− u(ht(ω
′))]

∑
i≥t
βi+1u(fi(ω))−
∑
i≥t
βi+1u(fi(ω
′))

 =
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=t
βi+1 [u(ht(ω))− u(ht(ω
′))] [u(fi(ω))− u(fi(ω
′))] ≥ 0.
Therefore ht is comonotonic with
∑
i≥t β
i+1u(fi) and
∑
i≥t β
i+1u(gi). Denoting δ =
∑t−1
i=1 β
iu(di), and
using the fact that the Choquet integral satisfies comonotonic additivity and positive homogeneity we
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get
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, ht, gt, gt+1, . . . )⇔∫
δ + βtu(ht) +
∑
i≥t
βi+1u(fi)dv ≥
∫
δ + βtu(ht) +
∑
i≥t
βi+1u(gi)dv ⇔
δ +
∫
βtu(ht)dv + β
∫ ∑
i≥t
βiu(fi)dv ≥ δ +
∫
βtu(ht)dv + β
∫ ∑
i≥t
βiu(gi)dv ⇔
∫ ∑
i≥t
βiu(fi)dv ≥
∫ ∑
i≥t
βiu(gi)dv ⇔
∫
δ +
∑
i≥t
βiu(fi)dv ≥
∫
δ +
∑
i≥t
βiu(gi)dv ⇔
(d0, . . . , dt−1, ft, ft+1, . . . ) % (d0, . . . , dt−1, gt, gt+1, . . . ).
We turn now to sufficiency. A simple modification of Proposition 2 shows that (C), (TS), (M) and
(CS) imply P .1-5. Hence, by Proposition 1 there exists a continuous function u : X → R and a discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) such that the restriction of % over D is represented by the functional
U(d) = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βtu(dt).
Moreover β ∈ (0, 1) is unique and u unique up to a positive affine transformation.
We can notice that connectedness ofX and continuity of u imply that u(X) is an interval. By Lemma
5 of Kochov [16] this interval has non-empty interior. Re-normalize w.l.g. u so that [−1, 1] ⊆ Range(u)
and let x∗ ∈ X be such that u(x∗) = 0.
Lemma A.3. For every h ∈ H there exists dh ∈ D s.t. h ∼ dh.
Proof. See Lemma 8 of Kochov [16].
Define the function V : H → R by V (h) := U(dh). Since U represents preferences over D, the
function V is well defined and represents preferences over H. Consider now the set
U := {U ◦ h :=
∑
t
βtu(ht)|h := (ht)t ∈ H}.
For every h ∈ H, U ◦ h ∈ U is a function U ◦ h : Ω → R and will be denoted by capital letters. Kochov
[16] refers to these functions as util act.
Define now the function I : U → R as I(H) := V (h) where h ∈ H is such that U ◦ h = H . Notice
that I is well defined by monotonicity: if H = U ◦ h = U ◦ h′ then h(ω) ∼ h′(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω , by (M)
h ∼ h′ and therefore V (h) = V (h′).
Recall that F = ∪tFt. We denote Bo := Bo(Ω,F ,R), i.e. the set of simple, real-valued F -measurable
functions over Ω. Given a set A ∈ F , 1A ∈ Bo denotes the indicator function of the set A.
Lemma A.4. For all a ∈ Bo, there exists δ > 0 such that a ∈ δU , i.e. U is an absorbing subset of Bo.
Proof. See Lemma 9 of Kochov [16].
The next lemma extends I : U → R to I˜ : Bo → R and shows that I˜ is translation invariant and
β-homogeneous.
Lemma A.5 (I˜ is translation invariant). There exists a unique functional I˜ : Bo → R such that the
restriction I˜|U of I˜ on U is such that I˜|U = I. Moreover for every a ∈ Bo, for every α ∈ R, I˜(βa) = βI˜(a)
and I˜(a+ α) = I˜(a) + α.
Proof. See Lemma 10, Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 of Kochov [16].
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Lemma A.6. Let a, b, c ∈ Bo be such that c is comonotonic with a and b. Then I˜(a) = I˜(b)⇔ I˜(a+c) =
I˜(b+ c).
Proof. Fix a, b, c ∈ Bo such that c is comonotonic with a and b. Since a, b, c are in Bo there exists t1 ∈ N
such that a, b, c are Ft1-measurable. Moreover there is t2 ∈ N such that the range of β
t2a, βt2b and βt2c
is included in [−1, 1]. Pick n ≥ max{t1, t2} and define for all t ∈ N and for all ω ∈ Ω
ft(ω) :=
{
x∗ if t 6= n
u−1(βna(ω)) if t = n.
(6)
Notice that f ∈ H since it is finite (because a is finite), and u−1(βna(ω)) is Fn-measurable since β
na(ω)
is Ft-measurable and Ft ⊆ Fn. In the same way define g and h using b and c respectively in the place
of a. We have that U ◦ f = β2na, U ◦ g = β2nc and U ◦ h = β2nc. Hence
I˜(a) = I˜(b)⇔ I˜(β2na) = I˜(β2nb)⇔ I(U ◦ f) = I(U ◦ g)⇔ V (f) = V (g)⇔ f ∼ g.
Notice now that hn is comonotonic with fn and gn (and with x
∗) and therefore by (CS) f ∼ g iff
fh := (x∗, . . . , x∗, hn︸︷︷︸
n
, fn︸︷︷︸
n+1
, x∗, . . . ) ∼ (x∗, . . . , x∗, hn︸︷︷︸
n
, gn︸︷︷︸
n+1
, x∗, . . . ) =: gh
and therefore V (fh) = V (gh). Since U ◦ fh = β2nc + β2n+1a and U ◦ gh = β2nc + β2n+1b then
I˜(β2nc + β2n+1a) = I˜(β2nc + β2n+1b). Therefore (using Lemma A.5) we proved that I˜(a) = I˜(b) ⇔
I˜(c+ βa) = I˜(c+ βb). However by Lemma A.5 we have
I˜(a) = I˜
(
β
β
a
)
= βI˜
(
1
β
a
)
⇔ I˜
(
1
β
a
)
=
1
β
I˜(a)
and therefore
I˜(a) = I˜(b)⇔ I˜(
1
β
a) = I˜(
1
β
b)⇔ I˜(c+ β
1
β
a) = I˜(c+ β
1
β
b)⇔ I˜(a+ c) = I˜(b+ c)
We will prove now that I˜ satisfies comonotonic additivity on Bo.
Lemma A.7 (I˜ satisfies comonotonic additivity). Let a, b ∈ Bo be comonotonic, then I˜(a + b) =
I˜(a) + I˜(b).
Proof. Take a, b ∈ Bo s.t. a is comonotonic with b. By Lemma A.5 (translation invariance) I˜(a) =
I˜(0+ I˜(a)). Since b is comonotonic with a and with the constant function I˜(a), I˜(a+ b) = I˜(I˜(a) + b) =
I˜(a) + I˜(b) the first equality coming from Lemma A.6 and the second one from Lemma A.5.
Let a, b ∈ Bo, then a ≥ b means a(ω) ≥ b(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. We will prove now that I˜ is monotone.
Lemma A.8 (I˜ is monotone). Let a, b ∈ Bo be such that a ≥ b, then I˜(a) ≥ I˜(b).
Proof. By Lemma A.4 there is n ∈ N such that βna, βnb ∈ U . Let f, g ∈ H be such that U ◦ f = βna
and U ◦ g = βnb. Then U ◦ f(ω) ≥ U ◦ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and by monotonicity f % g. Hence
V (f) ≥ V (g) ⇔ I˜(βna) ≥ I˜(βna) ⇔ I˜(a) ≥ I˜(a) (where the last equivalence comes from Lemma
A.5).
We will prove now that I˜ is positively homogeneous.
Lemma A.9 (I˜ is positively homogeneous). For all α ≥ 0, for all a ∈ Bo I˜(αa) = αI˜(a).
Proof. This comes from Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.8 as noticed by Schmeidler [30] in Remark 1 p.
256.
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We proved therefore that I˜ : Bo → R satisfies comonotonic additivity (Lemma A.7) and positive
homogeneity (Lemma A.9) and thus defining defining v(A) = I˜(1A) for A ∈ F , we can use Proposition
1 of Schmeidler [30] and we can conclude that for all a ∈ Bo
I˜(a) =
∫
adv.
Hence for all f, g ∈ H,
f % g iff I(U ◦ f) ≥ I(U ◦ g) iff
∫ ∑
t
βtu(ft)dv ≥
∫ ∑
t
βtu(gt)dv.
We turn to uniqueness. The fact that that β si unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation
comes from Koopmans [19].
Suppose now that the preference relation is represented by J(U ◦ f) := (1 − β)
∫ ∑
t β
tu(ft)dv
′. Fix
A ∈ F , let x1 ∈ X be such that u(x1) = 1 and consider the stream f ∈ H defined by
ft(ω) =
{
x1 if ω ∈ A
x0 otherwise
for every t ∈ N. Notice that U ◦ f = 1A
1−β
and therefore J(U ◦ f) = v′(A) and I(U ◦ f) = v(A). Take
x ∈ X such that u(x) = v(A) and define g ∈ H by g := (x, x, . . . ). Since U ◦ g = v(A) we obtain that
I(U ◦ g) = v(A) = I(U ◦ f) and therefore f ∼ g. Notice that J(U ◦ g) = v(A), and since we supposed
that J represents the preference relation over H, then v(A) = J(U ◦ g) = J(U ◦ f) = v′(A).
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Repeating the same steps as in Theorem 2, we can notice that the functional I˜ is additive on Bo,
i.e. for all a, b ∈ Bo
I˜(a+ b) = I˜(a) + I˜(b).
This comes from the fact that (SS) does not restrict additivity to comonotonic acts. Consider now two
sets A,B ∈ F s.t. A ∩B = ∅. We have that 1A∪B = 1A + 1B. Therefore
v(A ∪B) = I˜(1A∪B) = I˜(1A + 1B) = I˜(1A) + I˜(1B) = v(A) + v(B).
Which implies that v is a probability.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Necessity is shown as in the proof of Theorem 2, using the fact that when v is convex,
∫
(a+b)dv ≥∫
adv +
∫
bdv for all a, b ∈ Bo (see Proposition 3 of Schmeidler [30]).
We prove sufficiency. Since (PS) implies (CS) the proof of Theorem 2 is valid. The only thing that
is needed to show is that v is convex, i.e. v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
Let I˜ : Bo → R be the functional defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma A.10. Let a, b, c ∈ Bo be such that c is comonotonic with b. Then I˜(a) = I˜(b) ⇒ I˜(a + c) ≥
I˜(b+ c).
Proof. It follows using (PS) and doing the proof as in Lemma A.6.
Let A,B ∈ F . Notice that I˜(1A) = v(A) = I˜(v(A)1Ω) and I˜(1B) = v(B) = I˜(v(B)1Ω). Since 1B is
comonotonic with v(A)1Ω, by Lemma A.10 it follows I˜(1A + 1B) ≥ I˜(v(A)1Ω + 1B) = v(A) + I˜(1B) =
v(A)+v(B). Notice that 1A+1B = 1A∪B+1A∩B, and moreover 1A∪B and 1A∩B are comonotone. Hence
by comonotonic additivity of the Choquet integral
v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) = I˜(1A∪B) + I˜(1A∩B) = I˜(1A∪B + 1A∩B) = I˜(1A + 1B) ≥ v(A) + v(B).
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Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 1 of Kochov [16] and the Proposition in Schmeidler [31] p.
582.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Fix h ∈ H. Since h is bounded there exists a compact set Kh ⊆ X such that ∪tht(Ω) ⊂ Kh. Since
u : X → R is continuous, we can find M ∈ R+ such that |u(x)| ≤ M for all x ∈ Kh. Hence ∀t ∈ N and
∀ω ∈ Ω, βt |u(ht(ω))| ≤ βtM . Since
∑
t β
tM converges to M
1−β
, by Theorem 7.10 of Rudin [27], the series
of functions
∑
t β
tu(ht) converges uniformly on Ω. Define Hn =
∑n
t=0 β
tu(ht) and H =
∑∞
t=0 β
tu(ht).
Since Hn converges uniformly to H on Ω, for every ǫ > 0, there exists N ∈ N s.t. n ≥ N implies
supω |Hn(ω)−H(ω)| < ǫ. Hence, for n ≥ N , using the fact that P is a probability∣∣∣∣
∫
HndP −
∫
HdP
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫
|Hn −H | dP <
∫
ǫdP = ǫ
where the first inequality follows from Theorem 4.4.4 (ii) and (iii) of Rao and Rao [26] (notice that
Hn and H are simple functions by the finiteness of acts). This implies that the series converges and
limn
∫
HndP =
∫
HdP . Rewriting explicitly we obtain
∑
t
βtEP [u(ht)] = lim
n
n∑
t=0
βt
∫
u(ht)dP
= lim
n
∫ n∑
t=0
βtu(ht)dP =
∫ ∑
t
βtu(ht)dP = EP
[∑
t
βtu(ht)
]
.
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